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1. INTRODUCTION
Spreading the values of democracy, the respect for human rights and civil liber-
ties as well as democratic governance became integral parts of the foreign strate-
gies and external assistance policies of several large donors in the past decades. 
Donors increasingly used political conditionality attached to foreign aid and also 
put a large emphasis on supporting development projects that may directly im-
pact and improve the quality of democracy. Political conditionality came in sev-
eral forms, but most generally it involved providing positive incentives such as 
increased aid flows to countries undertaking democratic reforms. 
Conditionality may be rather explicit in donor-recipient dialogues, but an im-
plicit lesson is also identifiable in the external assistance policies of donors like 
the United States or the European Community. More democratic countries “de-
serve” more foreign aid, as aid may be more effective in a democratic setting, 
not to mention the moral dilemmas of supporting countries with non-democratic 
ruling elites. Nascent democracies may also be in need of external resources for 
building institutions and supporting state expenditure, as in the long run the new 
polities can only gain popular support by providing public services, as well as en-
suring economic growth and the creation of jobs. The possibility of increased aid 
flows after an event of democratic change may induce local elites to undertake 
certain democratic reforms, but also provide rival elites an incentive to take over 
the state and introduce democracy. Thus, providing credible commitments on 
increasing aid flows to democratisers can contribute to the democracy promotion 
as well as the aid effectiveness agendas of many donors.
This paper addresses the question of just how credible such promises may be 
in the case of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. 
Specifically, it examines how aid flows between 1980 and 2009 reacted to events 
of democratic change and whether countries introducing democratic reforms 
were actually “rewarded” with increased flows of aid. The policy relevance of 
this issue is rather straightforward: if donors were consistent in rewarding demo-
cratic change in the past, then any commitment to increase aid to new democra-
cies in the future may seem more credible. The issue is especially relevant in the 
aftermath of the “Arab Spring” revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. 
Will the consolidation of the emerging political systems in countries like Egypt, 
Tunisia or Libya be supported with increased levels of foreign aid?
Estimating aid allocation regressions on a panel dataset of 136 aid-receiving 
countries, the paper finds that on average Western (OECD) donors do seem to 
increase aid to countries which underwent a democratic transition. The paper 
thus adds to the literature on aid allocation by refining our understanding of how 
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the level of democracy and democratic change influence the allocation decisions 
of donors, an issue which so far has only been marginally studied. An important 
methodological contribution of the paper is the disaggregation of democracy into 
differences between countries and changes within countries, which can provide a 
more refined understanding of donor behaviour. 
The paper is organised as follows. The following section reviews the liter-
ature on aid allocation and the relationship between aid and democracy. Sec-
tion 3 presents the methodology of the paper and the baseline regression model. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results and tests them for robustness, while 
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. AID AND DEMOCRACY
The relationship between the amount of foreign aid a country receives and the 
level of democracy within that country is one of two-way causality. The level of 
democracy can be a determinant of how much aid is allocated to a country, but 
aid can also have an impact on democracy in the recipient. This section starts by 
reviewing the first channel, i.e. the results and approaches of the literature on 
aid allocation in order to provide a broader theoretical framework for the econo-
metric analysis, and then briefly assesses the literature on the impact of aid on 
democracy as well.
The quantitative aid allocation literature has long traditions, dating back to the 
works of McKinley – Little (1977, 1979) as well as Maizels – Nissanke (1984). 
Most studies group the determinant forces into three basic categories: donor in-
terests, recipient needs, and, more recently, recipient merit (McGillivray 2003; 
Hoeffler – Outram 2011). The broad (and more or less consensual) conclusions 
of the literature can be summarised in three points:
1.  Donor interest variables seem to be most important in explaining how much 
aid a country gets (Maizels – Nissanke 1984; Alesina – Dollar 2000).
2.  In the decades after the Cold War, and especially in the years since the turn 
of millennium, recipient need and merit variables seem to have gained in 
relative importance, signalling a shift in the determinants of donor behav-
iour (Dollar – Levine 2006; Isopi – Mavrotas 2006; Claessens et al. 2009).
3.  Donor allocation behaviour can be rather heterogeneous: there are clear dif-
ferences between donors, with some being more selective or altruistic than 
others (Schraeder et al. 1998; Berthélemy – Tichit 2004; Dollar – Levine 
2006; Berthélemy 2006).
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These three points aside, studies have identified a whole range of specific vari-
ables that impact donor aid allocation decisions. In the case of donor interests, po-
litical variables like colonial past, voting patterns in the United Nations General 
Assembly (Alesina – Dollar 2000), or the Cold War (Hoeffler – Outram 2011) 
have been shown to influence aid allocation. Economic donor self-interest also 
has explanatory power. Maizels – Nissanke (1984), for example, argued that the 
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the recipient country is an important 
determinant, while Younas (2008) proved that developing countries which import 
more manufactured goods, mostly produced by high-income countries, also re-
ceive higher amounts of aid. 
Recipient need variables have mostly taken the back seat, as opposed to donor 
interests. However, per capita income and infant mortality, signifying the finan-
cial and psychical needs of recipient countries, respectively, have been shown to 
be significant determinants of aid in some studies (Trumbull – Wall 1994; Wall 
1995), with their importance growing in more recent ones (Bandyopadhyay – 
Wall 2006; Dollar – Levine 2006). 
Recipient merit is usually understood in terms of how the partner country per-
forms either in economic terms or in some other issues such as institutional qual-
ity, democratic governance, the quality of democracy, or the respect for civil lib-
erties and human rights. The underlying logic of recipient merit variables is that 
better performing countries should receive higher amounts of aid, a conclusion 
underpinned by advances in the aid effectiveness literature. In the early 2000s, 
a large body of literature found evidence that aid is more effective in certain 
contexts than in others. These contexts mainly refer to “good” policies (Burnside 
– Dollar 2000), economic institutions (Collier – Dollar 2002; Burnside – Dollar 
2004), but also to political systems. Boone (1996) argued that the impact of aid is 
greater in liberal political regimes, and Svensson (1999) echoed this conclusion 
with results showing that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the 
respect for political rights and civil liberties in a country. Kosack (2003) con-
cluded that the level of democracy in a country is the main determinant of how 
effective aid is in terms of alleviating poverty. While many of these results have 
been debated (Hansen – Tarp 2001; Easterly et al. 2004; Dovern –Nunnenkamp 
2007), the conclusion emerges that if donor countries wish to maximise the im-
pact of their resource transfers on growth or poverty reduction, one path could be 
to give more aid to those countries which have better quality policies as well as 
better economic and more democratic political institutions. 
Measuring institutional quality, however, raises several questions, as indices 
measuring them are inherently subjective, and often not available in longer time 
series. Therefore, many papers have opted to proxy institutional or policy quality 
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with an output side measure, most commonly the economic growth rate of the 
country (Berthélemy – Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler – Outram 2011). 
Still, there are numerous examples of papers using indices that measure the qual-
ity of economic and political institutions directly, such as the World Bank’s Coun-
try Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) measure (Dollar – Levine 2006), 
or the Governance Matters indicators, also published by the World Bank (Ban-
dyopadhyay – Wall 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2009). Alesina – Dollar (2000) use 
Freedom House’s civil liberties and political rights indices and conclude that be-
ing more democratic has a significant, though rather small effect on aggregate aid 
flows from all donors. This result has been supported by Bandyopadhyay – Wall 
(2006), and also for many individual donors by Neumayer (2003a) and Hoeffler – 
Outram (2011), the latter using the Polity IV index instead of the Freedom House 
measure. It therefore seems that there is a significant and robust relationship be-
tween the level of democracy and the amount of aid a country gets. 
There is, however, an important limitation in these results: it is not clear how 
much they are driven by cross-country differences in levels of democracy and 
how much by within country changes (i.e. events of democratic change). Alesina 
– Dollar (2000) have tried to address this question by simply comparing aid flows 
before and after an episode of democratisation for individual countries, but this 
approach clearly cannot tell us much on the ceteris paribus effect of an event of 
democratisation on aid flows. Therefore, the existing literature offers no clear 
answer on whether a democratising country can expect larger volumes of ag-
gregate aid or not. This paper attempts to address this issue by disaggregating the 
measure of democracy into a level component and a change component (see the 
following section for more details) and providing ceteris paribus estimates of the 
effects of democratic changes on aid flows.
As mentioned, donors are not the same, and have different motivations for 
giving aid, different organisational structures, methods of delivery, etc. These 
differences are well documented in qualitative donor studies (Hoebink – Stokke 
2005; Lancaster 2006). Some donors, like the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, the 
European Commission, or the World Bank clearly place emphasis on supporting 
countries that have better quality institutions, higher level of respect for human 
rights, and “freer” political systems. Others, such as France, Japan or Belgium, 
have embraced political selectivity to a much smaller degree (Berthélemy 2006). 
There is evidence, however, that since the mid-1990s, many donors have become 
increasingly selective in their aid allocations, pointing to some degree of conver-
gence among donor practices (Dollar – Levine 2006). 
The literature on the reverse causation, i.e. the impact of aid on democracy 
is also rich, but inconclusive. In theory, aid can promote democracy through 
598 B. SZENT-IVÁNYI
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
three channels (Knack 2004; Heckelman 2010): (1) through technical assistance 
aimed specifically at improving democratic practices, such as the electoral proc-
ess, strengthening the judiciary or promoting civil society; (2) through political 
conditionality attached to aid; and (3) through improving education and increas-
ing per capita income, both of which may be conducive to democracy. On the 
other hand, aid can harm democracy by eroding democratic governance (Knack 
2001; Brautigam – Knack 2004; Busse – Gröning 2009) through channels like 
decreasing the need of local elites to raise revenues through taxation (Moss et 
al. 2006), inducing greater rent seeking among elites (Svensson 2000), over-
burdening state bureaucracies with related administrative requirements (Knack 
– Rahman 2007), or by releasing governments from binding revenue constraints 
(Janus 2009). 
In the light of these conflicting theoretical considerations, it is not surpris-
ing that the empirical literature has yielded mixed results. Knack (2004) found 
no evidence that aid in general supports democratisation, while Djankov et al. 
(2008) reported an outright negative relationship. These findings were echoed by 
Kalyvitis – Vlachaki (2012), although they added that the negative relationship 
was moderated when aid flows were preceded by economic liberalisation. Dutta 
et al. (2013) argue that aid strengthens the existing political system it encounters 
regardless of its nature, thus aid has no power to promote democracy in dictator-
ships. Kono – Montinola (2009) show that foreign aid cumulated over time will 
promote the survival of autocratic leaders. The more optimistic papers conclude 
that aid may promote democracy, but only under certain circumstances. Wright 
(2009), for example, argues that dictators who have a large chance of remaining 
in power after democratisation tend to respond to aid by democratising, but oth-
erwise aid will have no impact. Bermeo (2011) finds that aid provided by demo-
cratic donors increases the likelihood of democratic transition. This is good news, 
as most aid comes from democratic donors, although non-democracies like China 
are also increasingly important providers of aid (Tarrósy 2012). Kangoye (2011) 
concludes that aid can offset the negative effects terms of trade shocks may have 
on the quality of democracy, and Kalyvitis – Vlachaki (2011) as well as Dietrich 
– Wright (2013) find evidence that levels of democracy aid are positively corre-
lated with the likelihood of democratic regime change. 
Summing up this section, it seems that the causality running from democracy 
to aid allocation is stronger than the impact of aid on democracy, which is heavily 
contingent on recipient and donor context. The following section discusses the 
methodological issues and presents the dataset used.
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3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Model and data
In order to examine how events of democratisation influence the amount of aid a 
country receives, the paper estimates a standard “donor interest, recipient need, 
recipient merit” model on a panel of aid-receiving countries for the years between 
1980 and 2009.1 The observations are grouped into three-year averages in order 
to smooth out annual fluctuations. This is a reasonable compromise, as it still 
ensures a large number of observations. With 136 countries and 10 three-year pe-
riods, the dataset includes 1,360 maximum potential observations, but in practice, 
this number is limited by data availability. The panel is unbalanced.
The baseline panel equation is the following:
 ln(ODAcapit) = β0 + β1demit-1 + β2dem_levit-2 + β3Nit-1 + β4Mit-1 + β5Dit-1 
 + ηt + μi + εit (1)
The dependent variable, ODAcapit measures the total amount of aid country 
i receives from all donors in period t. Specifically, disbursements of net official 
development assistance (ODA) or official assistance (OA) are used, minus hu-
manitarian aid, in constant 2005 US dollars and per capita.2 The data is from the 
OECD (2012), thus it only includes aid from the donors which are members of 
the OECD’s DAC, and does not include non-DAC aid from emerging donors 
like China or some Arab states. The independent variables in equation (1) are the 
following:
dem: an event of democratisation;• 
dem_lev: the level of democracy in a country;• 
N• : vector of variables measuring recipient need;
M• : vector of variables measuring recipient merit;
D• : vector of variables measuring donor interest;
η• : vector of time fixed effects;
μ• : vector of country fixed effects.
1  1980 was selected as the starting year to ensure some degree of comparability with other aid 
allocation studies, as many use this year as their first observation (Berthélemy – Tichit 2004; 
Isopi – Mavrotas 2006; Hoeffler – Outram 2011). Although political conditionality and selec-
tive aid allocation criteria where not emphasised by donors during the Cold War, this can be 
easily controlled for in the regressions.
2  Data on ODA disbursements are used as opposed to ODA commitments, as disbursements are 
a better indicator of what donors actually end up doing. As events of democratisation may often 
be unexpected events, donor reactions to these may not be captured in data on commitments.
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Democracy is thus measured by two variables, a “change” variable and a “lev-
el” variable. In the baseline model, both variables are derived from the Polity 
index from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2011). The Polity index measures 
the level of autocracy and democracy on a scale of 20, where scores of –10 to 0 
denote an autocracy, 1 to 6 a partial democracy, and 7 to 10 a full democracy. The 
indicator has been re-scaled to a scale of 0 to 20.
The level variable, “dem_lev” is the Polity score of the country and it is lagged 
two periods in the regressions. The main independent variable of interest, how-
ever, is the change variable, “dem”, which is a dummy variable equalling 1, if an 
event of democratic change began in the recipient country in the given three-year 
period. This variable is lagged one period in the regressions. It is necessarily ar-
bitrary to provide an operationalised definition of an event of democratic change. 
In the baseline model, three different definitions for the change variable are used, 
all adapted from the definitions of democratic changes used in the Polity IV da-
taset. An episode of “major democratic transition” is understood as an increase 
in the country’s Polity score of six or more points, which also involves a shift 
from one of the three categories above to another, i.e. from autocracy to partial 
democracy or full democracy, or from partial democracy to full democracy (vari-
able major_ dem). The second definition, an episode of “positive regime change” 
involves a three point or larger increase in the Polity score, without necessarily 
leading to a shift in categories (small_dem). The third definition, “any event of 
democratic change”, simply refers to either of the two above (any_dem). By us-
ing these three definitions it is not only possible to examine how aid flows to new 
democracies change, but it is also possible to gauge whether autocracies that open 
their political systems to a certain extent, but stop short of meaningful democra-
tisation, can count on an increase in inflows of aid.
An alternative operationalisation of democratic change is also used to test for 
robustness. The definitions above are not only arbitrary, but also bundle con-
ceptually different types of democratic changes together. A shift in a country’s 
Polity score from –10 to –7 is different than a shift from –2 to +1. The alternative 
democratisation variable, “multiparty”, is also a dummy, and focuses on the oc-
currence of multiparty elections, based on data and definitions in Cheibub et al. 
(2010) and Dietrich – Wright (2013). Its value is 1, if the country holds multiparty 
elections resulting in real opposition parties present in an elected legislature for 
the first time ever, or after a previous breakdown of democracy. This variable 
captures only regime changes from autocracy to some form (partial or full) of 
democracy, and it is much more directly observable for donors than most other 
forms of democratic change (Dietrich – Wright 2013).
Two variables on recipient need are included. Per capita GDP at purchasing 
power parity is included as a proxy for the financial need of the country and the 
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level of poverty (variable ppp_gdpcap). This variable, however, can be an im-
perfect indicator of the country’s actual need, as it does not take into account the 
distribution of income. Following Trumbull – Wall (1994) and Bandyopadhyay 
– Wall (2006), a second variable, infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births is also 
entered, which can proxy the physical need of a recipient (inf_mort).
Besides the two democracy variables elaborated above, two further variables 
are used to measure recipient merit. First, annual GDP growth (gdp_growth) is 
included as an output side performance measure (following Berthélemy – Tichit 
2004; Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler – Outram 2011). Second, a simple measure 
of openness, the ratio of exports and imports to GDP is used in order to proxy 
“good policies”, as an input side performance measure. While it has been widely 
debated in the literature that openness is a rather crude measure for policy quality 
(Rodriguez – Rodrik 2001), it is the only indicator which is available for a large 
range of countries and in long time series. Other widely used measures of policies 
and institutions are the World Bank’s CPIA and Governance Matters datasets; the 
pre-2005 data of the former, however, are only available to World Bank research-
ers, and the latter is only available since 1996. A third source of institutional qual-
ity measures is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is available 
since 1984, but only for a rather small group of countries. Neither of the above 
measures are therefore suitable, and one must make do with the imperfect open-
ness measure. None the less, the “investment profile” index from the ICRG is 
used in robustness checks. 
Operationalising donor interests on the aggregate level can be difficult as dif-
ferent donors have different interests and finding suitable proxies on the ag-
gregate level under analysis can be difficult. In case of political interests, it has 
been argued (see, for example, Alesina – Dollar 2000) that donors give more 
aid to former colonies, thus a dummy to indicate whether a country was a col-
ony of any OECD DAC donor after 1900 is included (variable colony). As a 
further measure of political donor interests, dummies for various regions are 
also included, namely for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East 
and North Africa , and Europe (and thus Asian countries represent the baseline; 
variables africa, latin_am, mena and europe, respectively). These dummies can 
proxy the special interests that some donors have towards specific regions, such 
as the United States towards Latin America, or the European countries towards 
Africa. Dummy variables are also added for two well-known outliers, Israel and 
Egypt (Alesina – Dollar 2000). Economic donor interests are proxied with two 
variables: the stock of FDI relative to GDP in the country (variable fdi_stock; 
Maizels – Nissanke 1984; Berthélemy 2006), as well as the imports of the recipi-
ent from high-income countries, again compared to GDP (variable hi_inc_im-
ports; Younas 2008).
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One further control variable, the level of population in the recipient country is 
also added to account for the fact that less populous countries can receive higher 
per capita amounts of aid due to the high fixed costs of development cooperation. 
Time dummies for each three-year period are also used. Several further vari-
ables are used for robustness checks, but these are discussed in the following sec-
tion. All nominal price and exchange rate data have been converted to constant 
2005 dollars. The dependent variable as well as per capita GDP and population 
are entered in natural logarithm. All variables are taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2012), with the exception 
of the dependent variable, which is from the OECD (2012), and the democracy 
variables from the Polity IV dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010; Marshall et al. 2011; 
Dietrich – Wright 2013).
3.2 Estimation issues
A major problem in estimating aid allocation equations like (1) is endogenity, 
resulting mainly from two-way causation between aid and most of the independ-
ent variables, a case illustrated with aid and democracy in the previous section. 
Sadly, there is no perfect method for dealing with this problem. One possibility 
is to lag the independent variables, which may allow capturing their effects in 
time on the dependent variable. This also makes sense from an economic point 
of view, as donors most likely make aid allocation decisions based on data from 
previous years. Another possibility is to use instrumental variables techniques, 
but the main problem here is that so far no variables have been identified that can 
serve as good instruments, and in fact it is unlikely that they even exist.
When estimating equation (1), the independent variables are entered as first 
lags and the democratisation “level” variable as a second lag as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, as a solution for treating endogenity. However, the problem of endogen-
ity in the relationship between aid and democratic change is mitigated to some 
extent by one further issue. It can be argued that the main independent variable of 
interest, an event of democratic change, is actually rather exogenous to aid flows. 
While the level of democracy in a country may not be fully exogenous to aid 
flows, an event of democratic change is. The timing of an event of democratisa-
tion often depends on random events like riots against police brutality, or democ-
ratisation spilling over from neighbouring countries. The Arab Spring revolutions 
show this well: in Tunisia, the “Jasmine Revolution” after Mohamed Bouazizi’s 
self-immolation in response to police abuse, sparking riots among a population 
already upset due to rising food prices. The example of Tunisia quickly spread to 
other Arab countries, leading to political change in Egypt and Libya. 
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Concerning estimation methods, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that al-
most all econometric methods have been tried in the aid allocation literature, rang-
ing from simple and pooled OLS (Maizels – Nissanke 1984; Wall 1995; Alesina – 
Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003b; Dollar – Levin 2006; Younas 2008) through more 
sophisticated panel methods like fixed effects (Trumbull – Wall 1994; Neumayer 
2003c; Bandyopadhyay – Wall 2006) and random effects (Neumayer 2003c) to 
instrumental variable panel methods like 2SLS with fixed effects, although only 
for a special case where instruments were actually available (Chauvet 2002). Pa-
pers using bilateral aid flows instead of aggregate aid flows must also cope with 
the censored nature of the dependent variable, as not all countries receive aid 
from every donor. Berthélemy (2006), for example, recommends using either a 
Tobit model or two-step methods like Heckmann estimation in these cases. This 
is, however, not an issue in the current case of using aggregate aid flows from all 
donors, as basically every country in the dataset receives some amount of aid in 
every three-year period. There were only five recipient-periods (out of the poten-
tial dataset of 1,360 observations) which did not receive any aid; in these cases, 
a minuscule amount of 0.01 million dollars divided by the country’s population 
was added. It is unlikely that this would bias the results.
To ensure the robustness of results, equation (1) is estimated with three dif-
ferent methods. First, pooled OLS is used, which is clearly not an ideal method 
for estimating panel equations, but it can serve as useful baseline. Second, the 
equation is estimated with random effects, which is suited to the panel nature of 
the data and allows the estimation of time-invariant variables. However, random 
effects assume that the time-invariant country effects are orthogonal to the error 
term, an assumption which is most likely not valid. Thus, the third (and preferred) 
method is the fixed effects panel estimator, which can control for time-invariant 
donor political and strategic interests by first-differencing the equation (Trum-
bull – Wall 1994). The downside of fixed effects is that the effects of the time-
invariant variables cannot be estimated, but none of these variables are of primary 
interest in this case. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Our dataset includes 73 events of major democratic transitions and 47 positive 
regime changes, the geographic and temporal distribution of which are shown in 
Table 1. There are 111 events which satisfy the conditions of the multiparty elec-
tions control variable. 
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Table 2 shows how average levels of aid per capita changed during and after 
these democratic transitions, again in regional breakdown. The table uses the 
three-year averages approach described in Section 3. “Before” and “after” av-
erages represent three-year periods before and after a three-year period during 
which an event of democratic change began. Data for each three-year “before”, 
“during”, and “after” period were averaged across regions, using country popula-
tions as weights. Results in Table 2 indicate that donors have reacted differently 
to democratisations in different regions. Both types of democratic changes were 
followed by increases in aid in Europe and Latin-America, and major transitions 
were also rewarded in Asia. The strong changes in aid to European countries 
are actually even downplayed by the data, as many countries which gained their 
independence in parallel to becoming democratic (such as the successor states of 
Table 1. Number of major democratic changes and positive regime changes 
by regions and decades
Major democratic transitions Positive regime changes
Total1980–
1988
1989–
2000
2001–
2009
1980–
1988
1989–
2000
2001–
2009
Asia and Oceania 2 7 5 5 1 3 23
Europe 0 10 0 0 3 1 14
Middle East and 
North Africa 1 1 0 2 5 2 11
Latin America 8 8 1 2 2 0 21
Sub-Saharan Africa 2 21 7 0 15 6 51
Total 13 47 13 9 26 12 120
Note: 1980–88 represents periods 1, 2 and 3; 1989–2000 periods 4, 5, 6 and 7; 2001–2009 periods 8, 9 and 10 
of the dataset.
Source: Based on Marshall et al. (2011).
Table 2. Average regional aid per capita levels before, during and after democratisation episodes 
(at 2005 constant dollars and exchange rates)
Major democratic transitions Positive regime changes
Before During After Before During After
Asia and Oceania 13.2 13.7 15.0 15.7 13.4 13.6
Europe 3.0 39.3 44.3 29.8 30.6 41.6
Middle East and 
North Africa 16.4 6.3 5.6 36.2 32.9 27.1
Latin America 7.5 12.9 15.7 17.1 18.3 23.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.6 44.4 35.2 43.5 37.4 34.4
Note: Each “before”, “during”, “after” period represents three-year population weighted averages.
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD (2012) and Marshall et al. (2011).
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the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) are not included in the 
data. However, neither type of democratisation was followed by higher aid per 
capita levels in Sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East and North Africa. 
However, one should not draw any strong conclusions based on the data in 
Table 2. Simple before-after data can be powerful, but also misleading, as they do 
not account for the effects of other factors. Democratic transitions may be accom-
panied by a strong recession (as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the early 1990s), increasing poverty, or violent conflict, each of which may have 
an impact on aid flows. Also, even though the regional averages may suggest 
otherwise, there are examples in the data of cases even in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where donors have increased aid flows after an event of democratisation (such as 
Zambia in 1991). In addition, the three-year averages may hide some changes in 
aid, as donors may react much more quickly to democratic changes.
Coefficients of correlation between the main dependent variable and the inde-
pendent variables are shown in Table 3.
4.2 Results and sensitivity analysis
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the baseline model in equation (1) and 
also includes some sensitivity tests. Model 1 estimates the equation using pooled 
OLS. Looking first at the main variable of interest, an event of any democratic 
change is significant and its coefficient is economically meaningful, as it implies 
that a country undertaking democratic reforms can, ceteris paribus, expect an 
approximately 26% increase in aid per capita. The level of democracy is also 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of main variables
ln_
ODA_
cap
ln_
population polity
inf_
mort
fdi_
stock openness
ln_ppp_
gdpcap
gdp_
growth
ln_population –0.54 1.00
dem_lev 0.02 –0.01 1.00
inf_mort 0.26 0.05 –0.40 1.00
fdi_stock 0.05 –0.13 0.04 0.04 1.00
openness 0.12 –0.43 0.05 –0.36 0.24 1.00
ln_ppp_gdpcap –0.31 –0.14 0.22 –0.78 –0.05 0.38 1.00
gdp_growth –0.02 0.06 –0.02 –0.06 0.29 0.13 0.04 1.00
hi_inc_imports –0.01 –0.04 –0.12 –0.05 0.08 0.08 0.26 0.07
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD (2012), WDI (2012) and Marshall et al. (2011).
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Table 4. Estimation results of aid allocation regressions
(1)
Pooled 
OLS
(2)
Random 
effects
(3)
Fixed 
effects
(4)
Fixed 
effects
(5)
Fixed 
effects
(6)
Fixed 
effects
(7)
Fixed 
effects
(8)
Fixed 
effects
ln_populationt–1 –0.585***
(–20.818)
–0.585***
(–10.292)
–3.422***
(–2.712)
–3.409**
(–2.425)
–3.425***
(–2.707)
–2.544***
(–2.979)
–3.432***
(–2.699)
–3.416***
(–2.693)
dem_levt–2 0.025***
(3.033)
0.027*
(1.785)
0.016
(1.340)
0.017
(1.252)
0.016
(1.300)
0.013
(1.185)
0.019
(1.397)
0.012
(1.070)
any_demt–1 0.262**
(2.509)
0.260***
(2.669)
0.250**
(2.508)
0.292***
(2.711)
0.254**
(2.524)
0.224**
(2.432)
0.252**
(2.529)
–
multiparty t–1 – – – – – – – 0.186**
(2.127)
inf_mortt–1 –0.001
(–0.489)
0.000
(0.068)
–0.008
(–1.476)
–0.007
(–1.027)
–0.007
(–1.251)
–0.007
(–1.321)
–0.008
(–1.531)
–0.008
(–1.378)
colony 0.036
(0.263)
–0.079
(–0.323) – – – – – –
fdi_stockt–1 –0.003***
(–3.789)
–0.002***
(–2.717)
–0.002***
(–3.018)
–0.003***
(–2.840)
–0.002***
(–3.033)
–0.001
(–0.710)
–0.002***
(–3.069)
–0.002***
(–2.858)
opennesst–1 0.004***
(2.926)
0.004**
(2.425)
0.005**
(2.434)
0.003
(1.093)
0.005**
(2.267)
0.003
(1.518)
0.005**
(2.449)
0.005**
(2.540)
africa
0.135
(1.132)
0.244
(0.823) – – – – – –
latin_am
0.458***
(2.943)
0.290
(0.859) – – – – – –
europe
0.946***
(4.266)
0.860**
(2.483) – – – – – –
mena
0.824***
(4.393)
0.445
(1.013) – – – – – –
Israel
3.676***
(13.549)
3.292***
(7.736) – – – – – –
Egypt
2.167***
(10.664)
2.145***
(6.189) – – – – – –
ln_ppp_gdpcapt–1 –0.945***
(–9.602)
–0.787***
(–4.485)
–0.723***
(–3.225)
–0.941***
(–2.844)
–0.758***
(–3.263)
–0.739**
(–2.591)
–0.730***
(–3.208)
–0.725***
(–3.131)
gdp_growtht–1 0.006
(0.862)
0.004
(0.629)
–0.002
(–0.230)
–0.006
(–0.470)
–0.003
(–0.337)
0.004
(0.537)
–0.001
(–0.166)
–0.003
(–0.332)
hi_inc_importst–1 0.008***
(3.167)
0.008
(1.484)
0.002
(0.226)
0.007
(0.818)
0.001
(0.201)
0.007
(1.024)
0.002
(0.264)
0.002
(0.209)
inv_prott–1 – – – –0.008
(–0.232)
– – – –
conflict – – – – –0.032
(–1.486)
– – –
military exp – – – – – –0.002
(–0.154)
– –
cold_war*any_
dem
– – – – – – 0.255
(1.270)
–
constant 18.861***
(23.841)
17.534***
(10.533)
64.237***
(3.020)
66.492***
(2.656)
64.657***
(3.023)
50.183***
(3.321)
64.414***
(3.004)
64.175***
(2.998)
N 917 917 917 671 908 746 917 917
R2 0.57 0.54 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.34
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All models 
estimated with heteroskedasticity robust standards errors. Models include period dummies (not reported), which 
are jointly significant in all cases at the 1% level.
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significant, showing that more democratic countries receive more aid, although 
not much more: a 1 point improvement on the Polity scale implies a modest 2.5% 
increase in aid.
The pooled OLS model also confirms some basic expectations and previous 
findings of the literature. GDP per capita and the population of the recipient coun-
try are both highly significant. The openness variable is also a significant deter-
minant of aid per capita flows. The trade variable turns out to be significant too, 
implying that those countries that import more from high income countries also 
get more aid. The FDI stock variable, on the other hand, is significant but with a 
negative sign, which means that FDI and aid are rather substitutes to each other. 
Countries with higher FDI stocks receive lower per capita aid. These results in-
dicate that economic donor self-interests may be at play in the case of trade, but 
not in the case of FDI.
As explained above, pooled OLS is not the best estimator. In order to mitigate 
the bias caused by unobserved country effects to some extent, model 1 also in-
cludes dummy variables for these fixed effects, as outlined in Section 3. The re-
gional dummies are significant for the relatively higher income regions, Europe, 
Latin-America, and the Middle East and North Africa. Interestingly, the dummy 
on colonial past is not significant, a finding which contradicts some of the previ-
ous literature (such as Alesina – Dollar 2000). The most likely reason for this 
contradiction is the different time periods used in the analyses. As the panel in 
this paper includes data up to 2009, it may be possible that the gradual shift away 
from giving disproportional amounts of aid to former colonies by donors like 
France and the UK, apparent since the late 1990s (Pacquement 2010), dominates 
the data.
Model 2 uses the random effects estimator. The significance of the democratic 
change variable increases in this model and its coefficient practically remains 
the same. The level of democracy is still significant, although only at the 10% 
level. The significance of some other variables also changes in the random effects 
model, the Latin America and North Africa and Middle East dummies, as well as 
the variable on imports from high income countries are no longer significant.
In model 3, the preferred fixed effects estimator is used. A Hausmann test 
confirms that fixed effects is indeed a better estimator than random effects (χ² = 
56.24, p = 0.00). The model confirms the findings of the previous models for the 
democratic change variable. There is, however, one important change. The level 
of democracy variable now loses its significance. This result can indicate that 
donors do not actually give more aid to more democratic countries, but they do 
increase aid to countries undergoing democratic change. This can also imply that 
previous results in the literature on the significance of the level of democracy 
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were driven by changes in democracy within countries rather than differences 
across countries. 
In order to check the robustness of the results in model 3, several further control 
variables were introduced that may influence donor allocation decisions. Models 
4 to 7 include these tests. In model 4, a variable on the investment profile of the 
recipient country is introduced, taken from ICRG (variable inv_pro). This measure 
includes assessments on the rule of law in a country, the risk of expropriation and 
the viability of contracts, and thus can be thought of as an indicator of the quality 
of economic institutions in the country. It is measured on a scale of 0 to 12, with 
higher numbers representing a less risky investment environment. The downside of 
the indicator, however, is that its time series is only available from 1984 and cov-
ers a lower number of countries, thus greatly reducing the number of observations 
in the model. Despite this problem, the results on the democratic change variable 
do not change, and the inv_pro variable is insignificant. The variable on openness, 
however, loses its significance, which is likely due to the fact that it is highly cor-
related with the new variable and the estimator is not able to sufficiently differenti-
ate between their effects. In model 5, a variable measuring the intensity of civilian 
and international conflicts in a recipient is introduced, taken from Marshall (2012). 
This variable is not significant either and does not alter the results. Model 6 adds 
a variable on military expenditures per GDP from the World Development Indi-
cators, which again greatly reduces the number of observations, causing the FDI 
and openness variables to lose their significance. However, the new variable is not 
significant and it does not affect the significance of the democratic change vari-
able. Finally, in model 7, an interaction variable between the democratic change 
dummy and a dummy for the period of the Cold War is included. The logic of this 
is that donors may have been less sensitive to rewarding democratic change during 
the Cold War, as strategic concerns were more dominant. However, this variable is 
insignificant too and does not change the results.
Model 8 uses same specification as model 3, but with the alternative measure 
for democratic change, i.e. holding multiparty elections for the first time, also 
lagged one period. The multiparty variable is significant, although the size of the 
coefficient is smaller than that of the any_dem variable in model 3. The signifi-
cance of the other variables does not change. All the previous regressions (models 
4 to 7) were also re-run with multiparty variable, and it turned out to be signifi-
cant in all cases (these results are not reported). This indicates that our results 
hold irrespective of how democratisation is operationalised. 
As a further step in the sensitivity analysis, the variable on democratic change 
from the Polity dataset was broken up according to the two definitions outlined in 
Section 3, i.e. major democratic transitions and positive regime changes. These 
results are included in model 9 in Table 5. The disaggregation of the democratic 
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Table 5. Estimation results of aid allocation regressions
(9)
Fixed effects
(10)
Fixed effects
(11)
Fixed effects
(12)
Fixed effects
(13)
Fixed effects
(14)
Fixed effects
ln_populationt–1 –3.424***
(–2.713)
–3.069***
(–2.622)
–3.797***
(–3.653)
–3.498***
(–2.711)
–3.394***
(–2.712)
–3.457***
(–2.741)
dem_levt–2 0.017
(1.344) – –
0.021
(1.483)
0.022
(1.610)
0.021
(1.519)
dem_levt–3 – 0.005(0.413) – – – –
dem_levt–6 – – 0.022
(1.893)
– – –
major_demt–1 0.307***
(2.617)
0.245**
(2.236)
0.227**
(2.074)
0.181*
(1.915)
0.310***
(2.622)
0.296**
(2.455)
major_demt–2 – 0.202(1.355)
0.315***
(2.665)
– – –
major_demt–3 – – 0.354***
(2.999)
– – –
major_demt–4 – – 0.287**
(2.075)
– – –
major_demt–5 – – 0.218
(1.523)
– – –
small_dem t–1 0.172
(1.224)
0.182
(1.308)
0.074
(0.862)
0.186
(1.316)
0.172
(1.207)
0.190
(1.349)
small_dem t–2 – 0.083(0.769)
0.137
(1.497) – – –
small_dem t–3 – – 0.276***(3.142) – – –
small_dem t–4 – – 0.168*(1.761) – – –
small_dem t–5 – – 0.192*(1.806) – – –
dem_revers t–1 – – – – –0.299**(–2.475)
–0.279**
(–2.286)
major_dem*africa – – – –0.116(–1.012) – –
major_dem *latin_am – – – 0.301**(1.986) – –
major_dem *europe – – – 0.802*(1.773) – –
major_dem *mena – – – 0.602***(3.800) – –
inf_mortt–1 –0.008
(–1.462)
–0.011*
(–1.929)
–0.009*
(–1.782)
–0.008
(–1.402)
–0.007
(–1.324)
–0.006
(–1.034)
fdi_stockt–1 –0.002***
(–2.924)
–0.002**
(–2.469)
–0.001
(–0.403)
–0.002***
(–2.921)
–0.002***
(–2.870)
–0.002***
(–2.849)
opennesst–1 0.005**
(2.410)
0.003*
(1.740)
0.003
(1.580)
0.004**
(2.270)
0.004**
(2.200)
0.004**
(2.106)
ln_ppp_gdpcapt–1 –0.722***
(–3.193)
–0.704***
(–2.848)
–0.370**
(–2.091)
–0.741***
(–3.178)
–0.724***
(–3.184)
–0.791***
(–3.285)
gdp_growtht–1 –0.002
(–0.216)
–0.003
(–0.391)
0.000
(0.149)
–0.001
(–0.135)
–0.003
(–0.351)
–0.005
(–0.566)
hi_inc_importst–1 0.002
(0.226)
0.006
(0.766)
0.006
(0.963)
0.003
(0.378)
0.001
(0.186)
0.001
(0.082)
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change variable shows that it is actually the major democratic transitions that 
have been driving the results. Countries undergoing a major democratic transi-
tion receive a significant increase in per capita aid, while cases of positive regime 
change do not receive significantly more aid. This result shows that donors are 
more likely to support meaningful democratisations than smaller, potentially less 
visible changes. 
In model 10, another lag for the two democratic change variables is added (and 
the lag of the level of democracy is also increased to account for this) in order to 
test how committed donors are to supporting new democracies in the longer run. 
The first lag of the major democratic change variable remains significant, but the 
second does not. The lags of the positive regime change variables are not signifi-
cant at all. This result is troubling: donors give more aid to new democracies for a 
few years after their transition begins, but after that aid per capita again decreases. 
Therefore, it seems that donors in general do not commit themselves to providing 
longer-term support to new democracies, which are actually highly in need of it. 
This confirms previous results by Carothers (2002) and Levitsky – Way (2006).
An important question concerning the robustness of these results is how ap-
propriate averaging the data for three-year periods is. Donors may react quickly 
to an event of democratisation and the three-year averages may hide such reac-
tions. The specification used thus far may not be able to capture this. Model 11 
therefore uses country–year data instead of the country three-year averages used 
so far. Using annual data instead of period averages does have a certain risk, as 
the high annual volatility of aid flows can cause distortions. However, annual 
data can allow to better test the timing of donor reactions and the duration of 
increased aid. Several lag structures have been experimented with and all show 
similar results; model 11 reports a structure with 5 lags. The first four lags of the 
major democratic change dummy are significant with meaningful coefficients. 
This confirms, but also refines the results of model 10: donors increase aid to 
major transitions the year right after the transition begins, and sustain higher aid 
(9)
Fixed effects
(10)
Fixed effects
(11)
Fixed effects
(12)
Fixed effects
(13)
Fixed effects
(14)
Fixed effects
conflict – – – – – –0.047*(–1.853)
constant 64.250***
(3.021)
58.476***
(2.931)
65.173***
(3.657)
65.520***
(3.010)
63.754***
(3.023)
65.443***
(3.059)
N 917 822 2,389 917 917 908
R2 0.34 0.33 0.82 0.34 0.34 0.33
Notes: *** significant at the 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All 
models estimated with heteroskedasticity robust standards errors. Models include period dummies (not report-
ed), which are jointly significant in all cases at the 1% level.
Table 5. continued
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volumes for three further years. Lags beyond the fifth are insignificant (these 
results are not reported, but available upon request), meaning that the support of 
donors trails off 5 years after a democratic transition began.
Model 12 tests whether there are differences in donor reactions to major demo-
cratic changes across regions, as the descriptive data in Table 2 implied. To do 
so, it includes four interaction variables between the major democratic change 
dummy and the four regional dummies used in models 1 and 2. The non-interact-
ed major democratic transition variable now thus measures the baseline, which is 
Asia. Although at varying levels, but all regional interactions and the baseline are 
significant, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Donors therefore seem to 
have rather consistently increased aid to democratising countries across regions, 
but have neglected Africa. This is an interesting finding that definitely warrants 
further study beyond the scope of this paper. Problems with governance in Africa 
were an important reason why donors began engaging in political conditionality 
and selective allocation in the 1990s, and democracy aid has clearly increased to 
the region during that decade (Dietrich – Wright 2013). This may not be reflected 
in total aid flows as donors may have responded by changing the composition of 
their aid (however, sectoral data on aid is only available from 1995, which makes 
it difficult to test this hypothesis). The literature on aid sanctions (Crawford 2001; 
Portela 2007) also provides evidence that donors have shown greater care about 
democracy in Africa by rather consistently cutting aid to African countries violat-
ing human rights and democratic principles.
Model 13 tests this issue of aid sanctions: do donors punish democratic re-
versals? To measure democratic reversals, a new dummy variable is introduced, 
also based on the Polity IV dataset and a similar logic as the democratic change 
variables. The dummy is equal to 1 if a decrease in a country’s Polity score of 3 
or more points begins in a given three-year period, and is also lagged. Again us-
ing the three-year averages set-up, the variable turns out to be significant, with a 
coefficient of a similar magnitude as the major democratic transition variable and 
with a negative sign. This result remains significant even after controlling for the 
intensity of civilian and interstate conflicts, which may have an impact both on 
democratic reversal and levels of foreign aid (model 14). Donors therefore not 
only reward major democratic change, but also punish democratic reversal.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper asked the question whether OECD DAC donors of foreign aid increase 
their assistance to developing countries where an event of democratisation hap-
pens. The data shows an affirmative answer, as in general donors do seem to react 
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positively to democratic change. The experience is therefore in line with the rheto-
ric of donors, which has been emphasising that democratic countries deserve more 
aid, both from a moral and an aid-effectiveness perspective. This general conclu-
sion can also help in giving credibility to the promises of increased aid that donors 
make, implicitly or explicitly, to autocratic or hybrid regime countries. More cred-
ible promises mean greater incentives for democratic change to happen.
The analysis, however, has also revealed some issues which nuance these con-
clusions. First, the greater the extent of democratisation, the higher the rewards. 
Donors tend to give more aid when countries introduce visible democratic chang-
es and introduce some, not necessarily perfect, form of democracy. Smaller and 
less visible democratic changes are not followed by significantly higher aid per 
capita. Second, support to new democracies is not a long-term commitment. In-
creased aid flows trail off after a few years. Third, the paper has revealed regional 
variation in the responses of donors, with Sub-Saharan African democratisations 
being the ones which have not received “rewards”, albeit the composition of aid 
to the region has most likely changed. 
These conclusions are relevant from a normative policy standpoint, at least if 
one accepts the (debated) findings from the literature that aid is more effective in 
democratic environments. Donors need to develop strategies to remain engaged 
in new democracies in developing countries, which are usually in need of exter-
nal financing to consolidate the new regime and build popular support. Further 
research is needed, however, to determine the types of aid which support this, and 
the types that do not. Also, as democracy is clearly the most fragile in Africa and 
there are still a large number of hybrid regimes in the region where sham demo-
cratic practices often serve to legitimise the ruling elite, an increased attention to 
promoting democracy in Africa may be needed. One element of such a strategy 
can be credible promises of increased aid in exchange for democratic reforms. 
Of course, aid and democratic conditionality should not be viewed as the proven 
best solution to promote democracy. It may well be difficult to consolidate de-
mocracy, which is seen as externally imposed. Such conditionality therefore must 
not be too obtrusive, rather just provide soft incentives to support home-grown 
processes and domestic actors. As this paper highlighted, the key issue is the 
credibility of promises of increased aid by the donor community. The track record 
thus far seems promising, but clearly there is room for improvement.
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